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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Darol Keith Anderson appeals from the judgment of the district court,
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery and
misdemeanor domestic battery.
On appeal, Anderson argues the district court’s factual finding that the
victim was unavailable for trial was clear error. He also argues the district court
abused its discretion when it permitted Officer Mortensen to testify about his
observations regarding the victim’s visible injuries.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 7, 2014, Lawrence Preston was preparing lunch when he
heard a woman screaming outside. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 154, Ls. 9-20.) Mr. Preston
opened his door and saw Anderson holding Erica Messerly and punching her in
the face.

(7/20/15 Tr., p. 154, L. 21 – p. 155, L. 21.)

Ms. Messerly was

screaming for help. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 158, Ls. 1-5.)
Mr. Preston was able to break them up and he took Ms. Messerly inside
his house and called the police. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 159, L. 18 – p. 160, L. 2.)
Anderson fled. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 160, Ls. 3-20; R., p. 12.) Mr. Preston observed
multiple injuries on Ms. Messerly. (7/20/15 Tr., 165 L. 15 – p. 166, L. 2.) Ms.
Messerly had a split on the bridge of her nose, a black eye, multiple cuts and
abrasions on her face, a cut on her neck, bruising and a bite mark on her
shoulder. (Id.) Mr. Preston also saw red marks and bruising on her arms and
wrists. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 166, Ls. 16-23.)
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The police arrived and interviewed Ms. Messerly. (R., pp. 12-14.) Ms.
Messerly reported that the night before, the night of September 6, 2014, she and
Anderson got into a fight which started because Ms. Messerly found
inappropriate photos Anderson had sent to another woman on his cell phone,
and Ms. Messerly kicked him out of bed. (Id.) Anderson then attacked Ms.
Messerly, held her down on the bed and choked her. (Id.) After he let her up,
she followed him downstairs and then she grabbed his cell phone and threw it in
the toilet. (Id.) Anderson then punched Ms. Messerly in the face. (Id.)
Ms. Messerly fled the residence. (Id.) Anderson locked all of the doors so
she could not get back inside. (Id) Ms. Messerly walked to a neighbor’s house
1
to get help. (Id.) When Ms. Messerly and the neighbor got inside the house,

Anderson was hiding in the laundry room and Ms. Messerly reported Anderson
was carrying a metal pipe. (Id.) Anderson threatened the neighbor and the
neighbor left. (Id.)
Anderson then punched Ms. Messerly in the face with a closed fist and
briefly knocked her out. (Id.) Anderson continued to beat Ms. Messerly. (Id.)
Anderson held a knife to Ms. Messerly’s throat. (Id.) Anderson then hit Ms.
Messerly with the metal pipe and punched her again. (Id.) During the struggle,
Anderson threw down the knife and bit Ms. Messerly on the neck and shoulder.
(Id.) Ms. Messerly was able to escape to a friend’s house. (Id.)
Later, Ms. Messerly and her friend, Melissa Watts, returned to get some
clothes. (Id.) When Ms. Messerly asked Anderson for her key and cigarettes,

1

This was a different neighbor, it was not Mr. Preston.
2

Anderson kicked Ms. Messerly in the stomach and she fell to the floor. (Id.)
When Ms. Messerly fought back, Anderson kicked her again. (Id.) Eventually
Ms. Messerly and her friend got Anderson to leave the house. (Id.)
At some point Anderson returned. (Id.) On September 7th, Anderson
grabbed Ms. Messerly’s cell phone and she tried to grab it back. (Id.) Anderson
then grabbed Ms. Messerly and started to pull and beat her. (Id.) This is the
violence that Mr. Preston observed when he called the police. (Id.)
The state charged Anderson with felony domestic battery, aggravated
assault, attempted strangulation and misdemeanor domestic battery. (R., pp.
40-42.) Ms. Messerly testified at the preliminary hearing. (R., pp. 43-49; Ex. 4.2)
Based on the preliminary hearing, the state amended the charges and charged
Anderson with felony domestic battery, two counts of aggravated assault,
attempted strangulation and misdemeanor domestic battery. (R., pp. 67-69.)
The information also alleged a deadly weapon enhancement.

(Id.)

The

magistrate court found probable cause and bound Anderson over to district
court. (R., pp. 43-49.)
The state filed a motion to declare Ms. Messerly unavailable for trial
because she had been hospitalized at Kootenai Behavior Health Center and
diagnosed with significant mental illnesses.

(R., pp. 117-121.)

The motion

attached an affidavit by Ms. Messerly’s doctor, Eric J. Heidenreich. (R., pp. 119120.) Dr. Heidenreich’s affidavit stated that Ms. Messerly was his patient at
Kootenai Behavior Health and he had recently examined Ms. Messerly. (Id.) He

2

Exhibit 4 is a redacted copy of the February 3, 2015 preliminary hearing.
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diagnosed Ms. Messerly with “significant mental illness, specifically a co-morbid
diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Substance Use Disorder[.]”
(Id.)

Ms. Messerly was transitioning into a new living environment and Dr.

Heidenreich stated that she was “very emotionally unsteady.” (Id.) He further
explained that testifying would “result in further deterioration of her current,
already fragile condition” and “pose a significant risk to [Ms. Messerly’s] mental
health[.]” (Id.) Dr. Heidenreich concluded by stating, “I emphatically recommend
that Ms. Messerly not testify at this time or any in the near future[.]” (Id.)
The district court held a hearing to determine whether Ms. Messerly was
unavailable for trial.

(R., pp. 145-147.)

Lisa Bunker, the manager of the

chemical dependency unit at Kootenai Behavioral Health Center, testified. Ms.
Bunker is a therapist with 20 years of experience and has a master’s degree.
(7/20/15 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 6-16.)

Ms. Bunker concurred with Dr. Heidenreich’s

diagnosis of substantive abuse disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.
(7/20/15 Tr., p. 11, L. 16 – p. 12, L. 5.) Ms. Bunker testified that if Ms. Messerly
were to testify at trial it could cause Ms. Messerly to decompensate. (7/20/15
Tr., p. 13, L. 23 – p. 14, L. 14.) She testified that they could revaluate Ms.
Messerly in another 90 days to see if she had stabilized enough to be able to
testify. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 5 – p. 18, L. 2)
Based upon the evidence presented, the district court found Ms. Messerly
unavailable for trial. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 32, L. 4 – p. 34, L. 11.) The district court
also found that Ms. Messerly had difficulty testifying at the preliminary hearing
proceeding, and that this difficulty “lends credence to Dr. Heidenreich’s
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observations and Miss Bunker’s testimony and observations from the witness
stand today.” (7/20/15 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 9-16.) The district court also noted that
Anderson was disruptive and had repeated outbursts at the preliminary hearing.
(7/20/15 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 9-16.) The district court found that under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 804(A)(4) and the case law, “the only rational conclusion to make
today is that Miss Messerly is unavailable and will be for the foreseeable future.”
(7/20/15 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 6-11.) The district court ordered that the state could
admit Ms. Messerly’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial. (R., pp. 142-143.)
At trial, Mr. Preston testified. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 149, L. 8 – p. 175, L. 10.)
Mr. Preston testified that on September 7 th he was preparing lunch when he
heard a “little bit of a ruckus” and heard a woman screaming. (7/20/15 Tr., p.
154, Ls. 9-20.) Mr. Preston then opened his door and saw Anderson holding Ms.
Messerly by the back of her hair and hitting her in the face. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 154,
L. 21 – p. 155, L. 21.)

Mr. Preston testified that Anderson was hitting Ms.

Messerly for probably a minute or so, but that it “seemed like forever.” (Id.) Ms.
Messerly was screaming for help. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 158, Ls. 1-5.) Mr. Preston
described the force of Anderson’s blows:
A.
I would say that if I were to be hit that hard, I’d probably
need stitches. I couldn’t exactly tell you the force he was hitting
her, but it was definitely someone attempting to disable another
person[.]
(7/20/15 Tr., p. 163, Ls. 16-23.)
Mr. Preston broke them up and took Ms. Messerly inside and called the
police. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 159, L. 18 – p. 160, L. 2.) Anderson got into his vehicle
and attempted to flee. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 160, Ls. 3-20.) Anderson almost hit Mr.
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Preston as he was backing up.

(Id.)

Mr. Preston testified he saw multiple

injuries on Ms. Messerly. (7/20/15 Tr., 165 L. 15 – p. 166, L. 23.)
Officer Mortensen also testified. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 176, L. 7 – p. 196, L. 1.)
Officer Mortensen testified that he interviewed Ms. Messerly and that he also
observed multiple injuries on Ms. Messerly. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 179, L. 22 – p. 181,
L. 5.) He observed a cut on her nose, that her eyes were starting to blacken, a
cut on her neck, large bruising on the right side of her neck, a bite mark on her
right shoulder and a large bruise on her left side.

(Id.)

Officer Mortensen

testified that Ms. Messerly’s visible injuries were consistent with the information
he obtained from the interview. (Id.) Officer Mortensen also took pictures of Ms.
Messerly’s injuries. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 181, L. 12 – p. 185, L. 11; Exs. 1-13.)
The district court instructed the jury they would hear a reading of Ms.
Messerly’s testimony, and that they should give it the same consideration as if
she had testified in open court. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 196, L. 18 – p. 197, L. 6.) A
redacted copy of Ms. Messerly’s preliminary hearing testimony was read into the
record. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 197, L. 25 – p. 198, L. 1; Ex. 4.) At the preliminary
hearing, Ms. Messerly testified that on September 6, 2014, after she kicked
Anderson out of bed, Anderson grabbed her by the throat, held her down on the
bed and punched her with a closed fist. (Ex. 4 (Tr., 6, L. 21 – p. 10, L. 2).)
While she was pinned down, he bit her. (Ex. 4 (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 7-15).) After she
was able to get up off the bed, Anderson punched her again in the face. (Ex. 4
(Tr., p. 11, L. 23 – p. 12, L. 5).) Ms. Messerly then ran downstairs and was
yelling for help when Anderson punched her again and knocked her out. (Ex. 4
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(Tr., p. 12, Ls. 6-18).) She also testified that Anderson hit her with a metal pole.
(Ex. 4 (Tr., p. 15, L. 20 – p. 19, L. 25).) Anderson threatened to hang himself
and then put a knife to Ms. Messerly’s throat. (Ex. 4 (Tr., p. 20, L. 1 – p. 21, L.
21).)
Anderson called witnesses. Robert Cook, Anderson’s son, testified that
he saw scratches on Anderson. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 198, L. 23 – p. 202, L. 19.)
Shantelle Beasley, Mr. Cook’s wife, also testified that Anderson had some
scratches. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 208, L. 17 – p. 211, L. 13.) Ms. Beasley testified that
she saw Ms. Messerly on September 7th and did not see any marks on Ms.
Messerly. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 212, Ls. 11-23.) Ms. Beasley was surprised to see
photographs taken on September 7th that depicted Ms. Messerly’s injuries.
(7/20/15 Tr., p. 214, L. 24 – p. 215, L. 15; Exs. 1-13.) Kimberly Sego also
testified that she saw scratches and a bite mark on Anderson. (7/20/15 Tr., p.
220, L. 21 – p. 222, L. 4.)
Anderson testified in his own defense. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 14, L. 18 – p. 36,
L. 17.)

Anderson testified that after Ms. Messerly kicked him in the bed he

reached out towards her voice and grabbed her throat. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 15, L. 8 –
p. 16, L. 22.) Anderson claimed he did not deliberately grab her throat. (Id.)
However, he later testified that when he grabbed her by her throat he pulled her
under him and kept holding her down by the throat for approximately 30
seconds. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 31, L. 25 – p. 33, L. 16.)
Anderson testified that after they left the bedroom, Ms. Messerly jumped
on him and beat him. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 18, L. 21 – p. 21, L. 21.) Anderson said
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that’s when he punched Ms. Messerly and she fell down. (Id.) Anderson also
admitted that at some point he punched Ms. Messerly hard enough to knock her
out. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 33, L. 20 – p. 34, L. 5.) Anderson claimed that the violence
that Mr. Preston observed on September 7, 2014 did not occur at all. (7/21/15
Tr., p. 35, Ls. 9-20.)
The jury found Anderson guilty of Count I – felony domestic battery that
occurred on September 6, 2014 and Count IV – misdemeanor domestic battery
that occurred on September 7, 2014.

(R., pp. 163-164.)

The jury found

Anderson not guilty on the remaining counts. (Id.)
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Anderson to ten years
with four years fixed. (R., pp. 214-216.) Anderson timely appealed. (R., pp.
220-223.)

8

ISSUES
Anderson states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err by admitting Ms. Messerly’s
testimony from the preliminary hearing at trial, in violation of Mr.
Anderson’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and the Idaho
rules of evidence?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the
police officer’s testimony vouching for Ms. Messerly’s credibility?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Anderson failed to show the district court committed clear error
when it made the factual finding that Ms. Messerly’s diagnosed mental illnesses
made her unavailable for trial?
2.
Has Anderson failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it allowed Officer Mortenson to testify regarding his observations of Ms.
Messerly’s visible injuries?

9

ARGUMENT
I.
Anderson Has Failed To Show The District Court Clearly Erred When It Made
The Factual Finding That Ms. Messerly Was Unavailable For Trial
A.

Introduction
The district court made the factual finding that, based upon Ms.

Messerly’s diagnosed mental illnesses, Ms. Messerly was unavailable for trial.
Since Ms. Messerly was unavailable the district court granted the state’s motion
in limine and allowed the introduction of Ms. Messerly’s preliminary hearing
testimony at trial.
On appeal, Anderson argues the district court’s factual finding was clear
error. Anderson argues – not that there should have been a continuance to
allow Ms. Messerly’s mental condition to stabilize – but that her mental illnesses
were not so severe as to render her unavailable.

Contrary to Anderson’s

argument, the district court had substantial competent evidence regarding the
severity of Ms. Messerly’s mental illnesses, including an affidavit from
Dr. Heidenriech, and the testimony of Lisa Bunker. Anderson has failed to show
the district court’s factual finding was clear error.

The district court properly

determined Ms. Messerly was unavailable and properly granted the state’s
motion in limine and permitted the introduction of Ms. Messerly’s preliminary
hearing testimony at trial.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine so we

review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine for abuse of
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discretion.” State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527-528, 328 P.3d 504, 507508 (2014) (citing Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 878, 204 P.3d 508, 518
(2009); Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 167, 158 P.3d 937, 943 (2007)). “A
trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of
discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the
applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of
reason.” Id. (citing State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521, 528, 300 P.3d 53, 60 (2013)
(quoting Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196 P.3d 341, 347
(2008)). The Court freely reviews questions of law. Id. (citing State v. Meister,
148 Idaho 236, 239, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009)).
A trial court’s factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they
are clearly erroneous. State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 266, 269, 159 P.3d 903, 905
(Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 669, 978 P.2d 227, 229
(1999); State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 863, 840 P.2d 400, 407 (Ct. App. 1992)).
“Clear error will be found on appellate review if the trial court’s findings are not
supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Bird, 119
Idaho 196, 198, 804 P.2d 925, 927 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho
483, 490, 680 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Ct. App. 1984)).
C.

The District Court’s Factual Finding That Ms. Messerly’s Diagnosed
Mental Illnesses Were Sufficient To Render Her Unavailable For Trial Is
Supported By Substantial and Competent Evidence
Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) creates a hearsay exception which

permits preliminary hearing testimony to be admitted at trial if the witness is
unavailable. Perry, 144 Idaho at 268-269, 159 P.3d at 905-906 (citing I.R.E.
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804(b)(1); I.C. § 9-336).

A witness can be unavailable due to then existing

mental illness or infirmity. I.R.E. 804(a)(4).
Further, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not prevent
the admission of preliminary hearing transcript at trial when the witness is
unavailable and the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
See Richardson, 156 Idaho at 527-528, 328 P.3d at 507-508.

“The Sixth

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that, ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.’” Richardson, 156 Idaho at 527-528, 328 P.3d at 507-508 (citing Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); U.S. Const. amend. VI).

“The

Confrontation Clause ‘is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.’” Id. at 528, 328 P.3d at 508 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
403 (1965)). “[T]his provision bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” Id. at 528, 328
P.3d at 508 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006); Crawford,
541 U.S. at 53-54).

Both Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) and the

Confrontation Clause allow the introduction of preliminary hearing testimony at
trial if the witness is found to be unavailable.
The district court made a factual finding that Ms. Messerly was
unavailable for trial due to a then existing mental illness. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 32, L. 4
– p. 34, L. 11.) On appeal, Anderson argues the district court’s factual finding
was clear error. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-16.) Anderson does not argue
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that the district court violated any other requirement contained in Idaho Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(1) or the Confrontation Clause.

(See id.)

Anderson’s sole

argument is that the district court’s factual finding of unavailability was clearly
erroneous because Ms. Messerly’s diagnosed mental illnesses were “not so
severe as to render her unavailable to testify at trial.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)
Anderson does not claim the district court should have granted a continuance to
see if Ms. Messerly’s mental condition would stabilize. (See Appellant’s brief, p.
13.) (“Nor is Mr. Anderson claiming the trial should have been postponed.”)
Frequently courts will determine whether a witness is unavailable due to a then
existing mental or physical condition based upon how long the mental or physical
condition is anticipated to last. See e.g. Perry, 144 Idaho at 269-70, 159 P.3d at
906-07 (analyzing whether the witness’s illness was of such duration that a
continuance was not a practical alternative).

Therefore, on appeal the sole

question is whether the district court had substantial, competent evidence to
determine that Ms. Messerly had a then existing mental condition that would
have rendered her unavailable on the two days of trial – July 20-21, 2015.

3

Anderson notes “there are no Idaho appellate decisions on unavailability
and mental illness” and then looks to other jurisdictions to determine when a
mental illness can render a witness unavailable. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 1316. (citing Burns v. Clusen, 798 F.2d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 1986); Warren v. United
States, 436 A.2d 821, 829 (D.C. 1981); People v. Lyons, 907 P.2d 708, 711
3

The district court also found that continuing the trial was not a practical option.
(7/20/15 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 15-18.) Anderson does not challenge this finding on
appeal.
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(Colo. Ct. App. 1995).) However, the cases cited by Anderson do not support his
argument. These cases show the district court did not make a clear error when it
ruled that Ms. Messerly was unavailable.
In Warren, the trial court found, based upon the testimony of two
psychiatrists, that the witness “would undergo far greater mental anguish than
normally accompanies court appearances of the victims of rapes (and
presumably other such crimes as kidnapping, terrorism, and hijacking) and that
her appearance in court ... would be likely to lead to severe psychosis, even
possible suicide.” Warren, 436 A.2d at 827-828. The D.C. Court of Appeals
reviewed the trial court’s finding by analyzing other cases where potential
dangers to a witness’s mental health rendered them unavailable for trial. Id.
(citing People v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 230 (1972) (two psychiatrists
testified the witness was “very vulnerable to stress,” had a tendency to seizures,
and that her “present and future mental health might well be injured by testifying
before the court”); People v. Lombardi, 332 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750-51 (1972) (based
upon testimony by the witness’ husband and psychiatrist, the court ruled had the
witness “been required to appear and testify in person ... her mental and physical
health would have been seriously jeopardized” and would have resulted in a
“further and perhaps successful attempt at suicide”); United States v. Benfield,
593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979) (psychiatrist testified that the witness should not be
required to endure a trial situation or to face her kidnapper because of her
mental condition)).

After reviewing these cases, the D.C. Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court’s finding that the witness was unavailable due to her
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mental illness. Id. The D.C. Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s
decision was supported by the evidence and found that if testifying would
present a grave risk to the witness’ psychological health, then the witness can be
declared unavailable. Id. at 829-830.
Here, like in Warren, the state presented evidence from Ms. Messerly’s
doctor that she suffered from mental illnesses and testifying would “pose a
significant risk to [Ms. Messerly’s] mental health.”

(R., pp. 119-120.)

Ms.

Messerly’s doctor also stated that “Ms. Messerly’s prognosis is poor” and
testifying “would result in further deterioration of her current, already fragile
condition[.]”

(R., p. 120.)

Further, “[t]estifying would put Ms. Messerly at

substantial risk for relapse on controlled substances and pose a significant risk to
her mental health” and he “emphatically” recommended that Ms. Messerly not
testify in the near future.

(Id.)

In addition, Ms. Bunker testified that if Ms.

Messerly were to testify at trial it could absolutely cause Ms. Messerly to
decompensate. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 13, L. 23 – p. 14, L. 14.) Ms. Bunker also
testified that Ms. Messerly should not testify.

(7/20/15 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 4-10.)

Thus, like in Warren, there was evidence before the district court that testifying
would harm the witness’s mental health.
In Lyons, the witness gave birth ten days before trial. Lyons, 907 P.2d at
711. At trial, after the defense had rested, the state tried to get the court to
declare the witness unavailable based upon a “one-sentence note” from the
witness’s doctor. Id. The witness’s doctor was contacted and informed the court
that testifying may cause the witness to become “tearful” but the witness “would
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suffer no physical or mental injury by testifying.” Id. The Colorado Court of
Appeals found that there was not sufficient evidence to find the witness
unavailable for trial. Id. The appellate court held that a witness is unavailable if
“requiring the witness to testify would result in further physical or mental injury to
the witness and is of such permanency that the witness would continue to be
unavailable even if a reasonable continuance of the trial were to be granted.” Id.
(citations omitted).
Lyons is easily distinguishable. In Lyons there was no evidence that the
witness had a mental illness and the witness’ doctor informed the court that the
witness would not suffer any mental injury by testifying. See id. Here, the state
presented evidence that Ms. Messerly has two diagnosed mental illnesses and
that testifying would cause mental injury to Ms. Messerly. (See R., pp. 119-120;
7/20/15 Tr., p. 13, L. 4 – p. 14, L. 14.)
The third case cited by Anderson is Burns v. Clusen. Burns is an appeal
from a habeas corpus petition. Burns, 798 F.2d at 934. The witness, L.L., was
sexually assaulted and robbed by Burns. Id. L.L. testified at the preliminary
hearing.

Id.

However, L.L. subsequently refused to testify at trial and was

admitted to a psychiatric ward. Id. The trial court ruled that L.L. was unavailable
for trial. Id. at 935-936. On appellate review of the habeas petition, the Seventh
Circuit held that the trial court erred by finding L.L. unavailable for trial. Id. at
937-943. However, the Seventh Circuit focused its decision on the fact the trial
court made the unavailability finding based upon stale evidence. Id. at 937-941.
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Specifically, trial was set for February 23, 1981, but L.L.’s doctor had not had
contact with L.L since October – some four months earlier. Id. at 935.
No findings on the basis of up-to-date evidence were made with
respect to the witness’ physical or mental conditions at or about the
time of trial, even though the time interval between the medical
examination of the witness and the determination of unavailability is
highly relevant. If the diagnosis of L.L. was of a short-term
“schizophreniform disorder,” the trial judge had to consider whether
the court should grant a continuance to allow the witness to testify.
Id. at 939 (citations omitted.)
Here, the state presented current information regarding Ms. Messerly’s
mental health. Dr. Heidenreich’s affidavit, dated July 16, 2015, explained he
“examined Ms. Messerly and have had multiple opportunities to observe her and
interact with her over the past few days.” (R., pp. 119.) At the hearing on July
20, 2015, Ms. Bunker testified that Ms. Messerly’s discharge from Kootenai
Behavior Health was “last Thursday” and she made personal contact with Ms.
Messerly while Ms. Messerly was a patient there. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 12, L. 22 – p.
13, L. 6.) On July 20, 2015, the district court made the factual finding that Ms.
Messerly was unavailable for trial – for the trial that started that same day.
(7/20/15 Tr., p. 32, L. 22 – p. 34, L. 12.) Therefore, unlike the trial court in Burns,
the district court based its factual finding on current information regarding Ms.
Messerly’s mental health.
As a result, all three of the cases cited by Anderson support the district
court’s factual finding that Ms. Messerly was unavailable for trial. The district
court had current evidence that Ms. Messerly’s mental health “prognosis was
poor” and testifying in the near future would “pose a significant risk to [Ms.
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Messerly’s] mental health,” “would put Ms. Messerly at substantial risk for
relapse on controlled substances,” “would result in further deterioration of her
current, already fragile condition,” and could absolutely cause Ms. Messerly to
“decompensate.” (R., pp. 119-120; 7/20/15 Tr., p. 13, L. 23 – p. 14, L. 14.) In
addition, the district court found that Ms. Messerly had difficulty testifying at the
preliminary hearing proceeding, this lent credence to Dr. Heidenreich’s
observations and Ms. Bunker’s testimony. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 9-16; see e.g.
Ex. 4 (Tr., p. 12, L. 19 – p. 14, L. 24, p. 20, Ls. 7-12, p. 22, L. 21 – p. 23, L. 4, p.
25, Ls. 12-22, p. 28, L. 14 – p. 30, L. 21, p. 40, Ls. 9-16).) The district court had
substantial competent evidence that forcing Ms. Messerly to testify on either July
20 or July 21 would result in severe harm to her mental health. Anderson has
failed to show the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous.
D.

Even If The District Court Committed Clear Error, The Error Was
Harmless
The district court did not clearly err when it found that Ms. Messerly was

unavailable for trial. However, even if the district court clearly erred, the error
was harmless.

“Where

a

defendant

alleges error at trial that he

contemporaneously objected to, this Court reviews the error on appeal under the
harmless error test.” State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600-01, 301 P.3d 242,
258-259 (2013) (citation omitted). “[T]he error is harmless if the Court finds that
the result would be the same without the error.” Id. at 598, 301 P.3d at 256
(citation omitted).
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The result would have been the same even if the jury had not heard Ms.
Messerly’s preliminary hearing transcript.

The jury still would have found

Anderson guilty of Count I – the felony domestic battery that occurred on
September 6, 2014. Anderson testified that on September 6 th he grabbed Ms.
Messerly by her throat and pulled her under him and kept holding her down by
the throat for approximately 30 seconds. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 31, L. 25 – p. 33, L.
16.) Anderson also admitted that he punched Ms. Messerly hard enough to
knock her out. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 33, L. 20 – p. 34, L. 5.) He also testified that he
put her in a “bear hug” because he “didn’t want her to go have sex with that guy
because that’s why she was bringing him back to my house.” (7/21/15 Tr., p. 25,
L. 15 – p. 26, L. 16.) Anderson was not entirely sure he acted in self-defense.
(7/21/15 Tr., p. 29, L. 30, L. 4.)
Did you make physical contact with her in any way except in
Q.
self-defense?
A.
No. I had to think that one through, but when I hit her I don’t
know – you know, I mean that was – I’m pretty sure that was self
defense. I mean I tried to get up. I tried to get up, and it was
getting – started – my bell was getting rung. I had to do something
to get her off of me.
(Id.)
The state also presented evidence regarding Ms. Messerly’s substantial
injuries. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 179, L. 22 – p. 181, L. 5; Exs. 1-13.) Officer Mortensen
observed a cut on her nose, that her eyes were starting to blacken, a cut on her
neck, large bruising on the right side of her neck, a bite mark on her right
shoulder and a large bruise on her left side. (Id.) Mr. Preston also observed
multiple injuries on Ms. Messerly. (7/20/15 Tr., 165 L. 15 – p. 166, L. 2.) The
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state also introduced pictures of Ms. Messerly’s injuries. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 181, L.
12 – p. 185, L. 11; Exs. 1-13.) Based upon Officer Mortensen’s observations,
Mr. Preston’s observations, Anderson’s admissions, and the photographic
evidence, the jury still would have found Anderson guilty of felony domestic
battery that occurred on September 6, 2014.
Even without Ms. Messerly’s preliminary hearing testimony the jury still
would have found Anderson guilty of Count IV – misdemeanor domestic battery
that occurred on September 7, 2014. Anderson testified this battery did not
occur at all. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 9-20.) However, Mr. Preston testified that he
saw Anderson holding Ms. Messerly by the back of her hair and hitting her in the
face. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 154, L. 21 – p. 155, L. 21.) He testified that Anderson was
hitting Ms. Messerly for probably a minute or so, but that it “seemed like forever.”
(Id.)

In addition, Ms. Messerly’s preliminary hearing testimony did not even

address Count IV, therefore the result would have been the same had Ms.
Messerly’s preliminary hearing transcript been excluded. The district court did
not commit clear error when it found Ms. Messerly was unavailable for trial and
permitted the introduction of her preliminary hearing transcript. However, even if
there was clear error, it was harmless.
II.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Permitted Officer
Mortensen To Testify To His Observations Regarding Ms. Messerly’s Injuries
A.

Introduction
Officer Mortensen testified that he interviewed Ms. Messerly about the

attacks and he observed her visible injuries. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 179, L. 22 – p. 180,
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L. 181, L. 6.) When Officer Mortensen was describing Ms. Messerly’s injuries he
noted that her injuries were consistent with what she reported. (Id.) Anderson
objected and the district court overruled his objections.

(Id.)

On appeal,

Anderson argues the district court abused its discretion because he claims
Officer Mortensen’s testimony constituted improper vouching for Ms. Messerly’s
credibility. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-20.)
Officer Mortensen did not vouch for the inherent trustworthiness of Ms.
Messerly. Officer Mortensen testified that her visible injuries were consistent
with the attacks she reported. Testimony that physical evidence is consistent
with a witness’ version of events is not improper vouching. Anderson has failed
to show the district court abused its discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187
(2009) (citations omitted).
In reviewing a discretionary decision, the appellate court “examine[s]
whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the
trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal
standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of
reason.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187 (citations omitted); accord
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2009). “However,
an abuse of discretion may be deemed harmless if a substantial right is not
affected. In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will
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grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the
parties.” Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
C.

Anderson Has Failed To Show the District Court Abused Its Discretion
When It Permitted Officer Mortensen To Testify That His Observations Of
Ms. Messerly’s Injuries Were Consistent With Ms. Messerly’s Description
Of The Attacks
Officer Mortensen interviewed Ms. Messerly and Ms. Messerly informed

Officer Mortensen that she had been repeatedly attacked. (R., pp. 12-14.) Ms.
Messerly described being held down, choked, repeatedly punched in the face, hit
on her side, knife held to her throat, and being bitten. (Id.) At trial, Officer
Mortensen testified regarding his observations of Ms. Messerly’s injuries. (Id.)
All right. Did she talk to you about what had happened
Q.
immediately before you arrived?
A.

Yes.

After having that conversation with Miss Messerly did you
Q.
observe any injuries on her?
A.

I did.

Q.
Would you please describe as best you can the injuries you
observed on Miss Messerly?
A.
There was several that I observed. There was – there – I
observed a cut on her nose, and her eyes were starting to blacken
on the interior of the eyes, which was consistent with what she told
me had happened.
I observed a little straight line kind of cut mark right on her
neck, lower part of her neck, was also consistent with her story.
(7/20/15 Tr., p. 179, L. 22 – p. 180, L. 11.) Anderson then objected that Officer
Mortensen was vouching for the witness’ credibility. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 180, Ls. 13-
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16.) The district court overruled the objection. (Id.) Officer Mortensen then
testified that he observed a large bruise on the right side of Ms. Messerly’s neck,
a bite mark on her right shoulder and a large bruise on her left side, all of which
were consistent with her report. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 180, L. 17 – p. 181, L. 6.)
Anderson made the same objection to each question, and the district court
overruled each objection. (Id.)
On appeal, Anderson argues the district court abused its discretion
because he believes Officer Mortensen’s testimony constituted impermissible
“vouching” for the trustworthiness of Ms. Messerly. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.
17-20.) In support of his argument, Anderson cites to State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho
900, 354 P.3d 462 (2015).

(See id.)

Ehrlick does not support Anderson’s

argument on appeal.
In Ehrlick, Agent Martin testified that she read several witness reports and
in her opinion those witness reports were not credible. Id. at 909-910, 354 P.3d
471-472.

The Court held, “[Agent Martin’s] testimony, offered by the

prosecution, and permitted by the district court despite repeated objections,
directly related to the credibility of witnesses and encroached on the jury function
to assess witness credibility.”

Id. at 910, 354 P.3d at 472.

Here, Officer

Mortensen did not testify that Ms. Messerly was credible or that she was
inherently trustworthy. Unlike Agent Martin, Officer Mortensen did not simply
read Ms. Messerly’s statement and then testify whether she was telling the truth.
Instead, Officer Mortensen’s testimony explained that the injuries he observed
were consistent with someone who had been repeatedly punched in the face, hit
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on the side, knife held to her throat, and bitten. It is not impermissible vouching
to introduce evidence that supports Ms. Messerly’s testimony. Testimony that
physical evidence is consistent with a version of events is not vouching for the
trustworthiness of the witness who made the statement.
Officer Mortensen’s testimony is akin to the common testimony by expert
witnesses that a particular injury is consistent with a particular weapon, attack,
defensive wounds or sexual assault.

For example, in State v. Aspetyia 130

Idaho 12, 13, 936 P.2d 210, 211 (Ct. App. 1997), the defendant was charged
with lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen. The victim reported that the
defendant had touched her with his penis in her mouth, between her legs and in
her buttocks. Id. At trial, two doctors testified that they physically examined the
victim and both determined that the victim had been sexually molested. Id. at
14, 936 P.2d at 212. Both doctors reported that the victim’s physical symptoms
“could be attributed only to sexual molestation.” Id. at 16, 936 P.2d at 214. On
appeal, Aspetyia argued that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to
the doctors’ testimony on the grounds their testimony was improper vouching for
the victim’s credibility. Id. at 14-16, 936 P.2d at 212-214. The Idaho Court of
Appeals disagreed and held the doctors did not impermissibly vouch for the
credibility of the witness because their testimony was based upon their physical
findings. Id. at 16-17, 936 P.2d at 214-215 (“These physical findings, which the
physicians deemed to be attributable only to sexual molestation, readily
distinguish this case from those upon which Aspeytia relies[.]” (citations
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omitted).)4 Here, Officer Mortensen’s testimony was not based upon his opinion
of Ms. Messerly’s inherent trustworthiness, but rather was based upon his
observations of Ms. Messerly’s injuries. Anderson has failed to show the district
court abused its discretion.
D.

Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion, The Error Was Harmless
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted Officer

Mortensen to testify regarding Ms. Messerly’s visible injuries. However, even if
the district court abused its discretion, the result would have been the same had
the district court sustained Anderson’s objections. In Ehrlick, the appellate court
found the improper vouching testimony did not change the outcome of the trial,
because there was ample evidence that the reports that Agent Martin questioned
were not credible. See Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 911, 354 P.3d at 473. Here, even
had Officer Mortensen not been allowed to testify that Ms. Messerly’s injuries
were consistent with her report – the jury still would have seen evidence of the
substantial injuries that corresponded to her testimony. (7/20/15 Tr., 165 L. 15 –
p. 166, L. 2, p. 179, L. 22 – p. 185, L. 11; Exs. 1-13.) Further, as noted above,
Anderson made several admissions regarding his attacks on Ms. Messerly
during trial. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 31, L. 25 – p. 34, L. 5.) Anderson testified he was
not sure he acted in self-defense when he hit Ms. Messerly. (7/21/15 Tr., p. 29,

4

The Idaho Court of Appeals also held that the doctors’ testimony was not
vouching because they were qualified as experts to present their opinions. See
Aspetyia, 130 Idaho at 16-17, 936 P.2d at 214-215. Whether Officer Mortensen
was qualified to determine whether Ms. Messerly’s injuries were the result of a
particular type of attack was not challenged below and is not challenged here on
appeal.
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L. 22 – p. 30, L. 4.) In addition, the jury heard Mr. Preston’s testimony that he
saw Anderson holding Ms. Messerly by the back of her hair and hitting her in the
face. (7/20/15 Tr., p. 154, L. 21 – p. 155, L. 21.) Even had Officer Mortensen’s
testimony that Ms. Messerly’s visible injuries were consistent with her report
been excluded, it would not have changed the outcome of the trial.
III.
Anderson’s Cumulative Error Claim Fails Because He Has Failed To Show Error,
Much Less Multiple Error to Cumulate
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and
of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. “However,
a necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than
one error.” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 149, 334 P.3d 806, 823 (2014)
(quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2008)).
Because Anderson has failed to show any error, there is no error to cumulate in
this case. Alternatively, even if errors in the trial had been shown, they would not
amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v. Gray,
129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135
Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors
deemed harmless). Anderson has therefore failed to show any cumulative error.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Anderson’s convictions.
DATED this 7th day of November, 2016.
__/s/ Ted S. Tollesfson_____
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Deputy Attorney General
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